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Anna Chernysheva

PhD (Economics),
Associate Professor,
Faculty of Economics,
Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University)
6 Miklukho-Maklay Str., Moscow, 117198, Russian Federation
chernysheva.a.m@mail.ru
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9240-6619>



Katrina Dobrova

D.Sc. (Economics),
Associate Professor,
Moscow Aviation Institute (National Research University)
4 VolokolamskoyeHw., Moscow, 125993, Russian Federation
kdobrova@mail.ru
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7249-0924>



Ekaterina Dobrova

PhD (Economics),
Assistant Professor,
Moscow Aviation Institute (National Research University)
4 Volokolamskoye Hw., Moscow, 125993, Russian Federation
ekaterinakomarova@bk.ru
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1795-5597>



Vera Kuznetsova

PhD (Economics),
Associate Professor,
Department of Taxes and Tax Administration,
Financial University under the Government of Russian Federation
49 Leningradsky Ave., Moscow, 125993, Russian Federation
VeVKuznetsova@fa.ru
ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8996-4193>

Transformation of economic interests in the context of the multipolar world order formation

Abstract. The national interests of countries directly depend on the world order established at a certain time, which constantly transforms, exerting key influence on international economic relations. Understanding the changes of the world order of economic systems allows to understand the transformation of the national interests of countries. All countries can be conventionally divided into attractor countries and satellite countries, which form their national economic interests in accordance with the interests of attractor countries. At the same time, satellite countries can eventually become attractors, and vice versa. The goal of the article is to study the existing world order and its transformation from unipolar to multipolar. To achieve this goal, the authors have explored a change in the concept of national economic interests depending on the influence of global changes in the economy and on the transformation of national economic interests in a particular world order; they have also analyzed the historical change in the world order and determined its current format and assessed the current export-import operations of the leading European countries.

It is assumed that the national economic interests of countries have changed as a result of the transition from a unipolar world order to a multipolar world order, including the national economic interests of European countries. As such, the national economic interests of countries should be transformed with due consideration of situational combinations of attractor countries. To test this hypothesis, the authors have analyzed publicly available documents, including statistical data on export-import operations of the key European countries, Russia, China, and the USA.

In general, it has been proved that a multipolar world order has formed at the present stage of international economic relations; decision-making at the international level and ensuring national economic interests depend on the situational cooperation of the attractor countries, while some satellite countries are gradually transforming into attractor countries.

Keywords: National Economic Interests; Economic Security; Globalization; World Economy; National Interests; Bipolar World Order; Multipolar World Order

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Чернышева А. М.

кандидат экономических наук, доцент, экономический факультет,
Российский университет дружбы народов (РУДН), Москва, Российская Федерация

Доброва К. Б.

доктор экономических наук, доцент,
Московский Авиационный Институт (Национальный Исследовательский Университет), Москва,
Российская Федерация

Доброва Е. Д.

кандидат экономических наук, старший преподаватель,
Московский Авиационный Институт (Национальный Исследовательский Университет), Москва,
Российская Федерация

Кузнецова В. В.

кандидат экономических наук, доцент,
Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации, Москва, Российская
Федерация

Трансформация экономических интересов в условиях формирования многополярного мироустройства

Аннотация. Национальные интересы стран напрямую зависят от сформированного на определенный момент мироустройства, которое постоянно трансформируется, оказывая ключевое влияние на международные экономические отношения. Понимание процесса изменения мироустройства экономических систем позволяет понять трансформацию национальных интересов стран. Условно все страны мира можно разделить на страны – точки притяжения и страны-сателлиты, которые формируют свои национальные экономические интересы в соответствии с интересами стран, являющимися точками притяжения. При этом страны сателлиты могут со временем стать точками притяжения, и наоборот.

Целью настоящей статьи стало исследование существующего мироустройства и его трансформация от однополярного к многополярному. Для достижения поставленной цели было рассмотрено изменение понятия национальных экономических интересов в зависимости от влияния мировых изменений в экономике, трансформации национальных экономических интересов в условиях определенного мироустройства, проанализировано историческое изменение мироустройства и определен его текущий формат, а также проведена оценка текущих экспортно-импортных операций ведущих стран Европы.

Предполагается, что на текущий момент национальные экономические интересы стран изменились вследствие перехода однополярного мироустройства к многополярному мироустройству, в том числе и национальные экономические интересы стран Европы. Исходя из этого, национальные экономические интересы стран должны трансформироваться, учитывая ситуативные комбинации стран-точек притяжения. Для проверки данной гипотезы анализировались документы, размещенные в открытом доступе, в том числе и статистические данные по экспортно-импортным операциям ключевых стран Европы, России, Китая и США.

В целом было доказано, что на современном этапе международных экономических отношений сформировалось многополярное мироустройство, а принятие решений на международном уровне и обеспечение национальных экономических интересов зависит от ситуативного сотрудничества стран-точек притяжения, при этом, определенные страны-сателлиты постепенно трансформируются в страны-точки притяжения.

Ключевые слова: национальные экономические интересы; экономическая безопасность; глобализация; мировая экономика; национальные интересы; биполярное мироустройство; многополярное мироустройство.

1. Introduction

The concept of «national interests» is often interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the term is stable from the standpoint of the state's foreign policy, because it describes the interests of the state in the world space. On the other hand, national interests form priorities for solving internal problems, which reflect the external ones.

The term «national interests» was first officially used in 1935, when it was included in the Oxford Encyclopedia and introduced by American scientists R. Niebuhr and C. Beard. After the end of World War II, H. Morgenthau (1948) published the writing «In Defense of the National Interest», where the concept of national interests was examined in detail. Later, J. Rosenau, W. Lippmann,

G. Kennan, C. Waltz, E. Furniss and others worked on the concept. In general, the concept of «national interests» is based on the statement of the English politician H. J. Palmerston: «England has no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests».

The national interests of the country are formed under the influence of two groups of factors:

- subjective: the country's status on the global stage, its internal image, and the system of strategic decision-making;
- objective: significance on the global stage, its potential, geopolitical position, availability of certain resources, and specifics of the national policy.

In this case, national interests perform the following functions:

- declarative/explanatory, which declares the intentions of the state in domestic and foreign policies;
- acquittal, demonstrating an explanation of its actions;
- evaluative, describing a specific situation and identifying potential partners;
- incentive, shaping the prospect of further action.

Consequently, national interests represent the objective needs of society expressed through a subjective form using the interests of the state.

The state determines ideology by accepting the doctrine of national interests and underlies the formation of strategic priorities by developing the concept.

The national economic interests should be determined as part of national interests, which are the main guideline for the development of the country's economy. For example, the country participates in integration organizations, holds economic reforms, and adopts various regulations for the state economy as part of national economic interests.

In other words, the development and adoption of the concept of national economic interests is a guide for the activities of both national and foreign companies. It must be noted that the concept of «national economic interests» is poorly developed both in domestic and in foreign regulations. The interpretations of the concept vary due to the following:

- lack of research into the concept of «national economic interests» separately from the concept of «national interests», thereby these concepts are often substituted;
- complexity of taking into account the fact that the carrier of national economic interests is not only the state, but also large national companies, which should be consolidated and adjusted in accordance with the interests of the state, if necessary.

The influence of the above reasons has led to the insufficient degree of development of the national economic interests structure in the context of the economy globalization. National economic interests are considered in the writings of many scientists only as part of national interests.

The national economic interests of countries are transformed depending on the type of the world order being formed at a certain moment in the development of international economic relations: a unipolar order, a bipolar order, or a multipolar order. They also depend on the position the country occupies in relation to the attractor country, as well as the process of transformation from the position of a weak country to a strong country.

Publications of foreign and local authors published in specialized journals and international trade portals, as well as publicly available statistical data were analyzed in this article.

National economic interests were studied in the writings of K. A. Borisovskaya (2018), A. A. Hryshchenko (2009, 2010), J. McDonald (2007), J. Y. Song and D. Q. Gong (2016), M.-C. Tsai (1998), N. V. Vasilenkova (2016). The study of the development of national economic interests - in particular, in Europe and the USA - can be found in the writings of foreign researchers R. Abdelal and J. Kirshner (1999), P. J. Conover (1985), J. A. Frieden (1991), R. Grabowski (2000, 2002a, 2020b), M. Jänicke and R. Quitzow (2017), E. Tretter (2011).

2. Problem Setting

The national economic interests of countries constantly transform, depending on the economic situation on the global stage, which is also determined by the current economic world order. As such, it can be determined that the national economic interests of countries are constantly transformed depending on changes in the economy and the position of the strongest countries. Such a transformation ensures the constant development of economic thought and changes in the concept. For example, mercantilists tried to understand national economic interests from the standpoint of a country that sought to ensure a trade monopoly, while physiocrats opted for the standpoint of the internal world development. A. Smith focused on the development of economic

interests of the leading country in industrial production. A well-known economist argued that liberalizing the economy would bring countries closer together within their own economic interests. The role of national economic interests was almost levelled, because they were not protected in the conditions of a liberal economy and cosmopolitanism.

In contrast to A. Smith, the American scientist A. Hamilton argued that the development of national economic interests was based on the development of manufacturing, the use of protectionist measures, the provision of export subsidies, and the development of a national bank.

German economists rejected the ideas of A. Smith, because they did not take the differences in the economic conditions of certain nations and economic structures into account. For example, F. List argued that each state required a certain economic doctrine within the framework of its own interests for its development. The free trade provides benefits only to advanced countries, while lagging ones further widen their economic gap. As such, the lagging countries must pursue a protectionist policy in order to protect their national economic interests from cheap goods imported from developed countries by establishing high customs duties.

K. Marx considered the interests of classes, which represented certain parties of the state, rather than the entire nation, to be determining factors of economic interests. Such marginalists as L. Walras, F. Wieser and L. Brentano argued about the leading role of reformism with the active participation of the state. J. M. Keynes argued that the developing national economic interests had to proceed from macroeconomic categories such as national income, savings, investment, and consumption. Such an understanding arose as a result of the economic crisis that erupted in the 30s of the 20th century, when developed countries were also threatened by national economic interests. At the same time, the understanding was established that national economic interests had to ensure the economic security of the country and to counteract the threats emerging within the state. Such threats were primarily unemployment and the overproduction crisis, which had to be regulated by the provision of subsidies and state orders, as well as by the competition control by the state. F. D. Roosevelt formulated the term «national economic security» and the Federal Committee for Economic Security was created during those years in the USA.

The monetarists proceeded from the low influence of the state on the country's economy, which was limited only by control over the money supply. As such, the main tools to ensure national economic interests, and thereby economic security, secured high economic growth by restraining inflation processes and ensuring competitive advantages for national business in the global economic system.

The end of the 20th century was described by a change in the global economic system, since the world order shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar one. Theorists of the left-radical, institutional, and neoinstitutional concept have come to the fore. Proponents of left-wing radical concepts argue that the economic rules and regulatory instruments established by developed countries slow down the pace of development of countries with lagging economies. The world market cannot secure the redistribution of income in a way that ensures the development of all groups of countries. As such, foreign trade does not ensure the development of countries with lagging economies, which means that the global economy needs significant structural adjustment. For example, A. Emmanuel believed that the main reason for a significant unequal exchange was that mobile capital had higher mobility than labor, and therefore the level of wages remained low in developing countries. As such, the national economies of developing countries must achieve self-sufficient development, and losses incurred in the short and long term will be paid off by economic prosperity in the long run.

The institutional approach is largely based on internal threats, which include poverty and low level of healthcare and education. The neoinstitutional approach is primarily represented by the works of Hernando de Soto, who considered the production of goods and services without official registration to be the main threat to national economic interests, which arose from the ineffectiveness of protecting property rights and violation of the rule of law. From his point of view, these reasons impeded the development of the economies in the post-Soviet space. This means that external threats had secondary influence on the economic development of these countries.

Many economists (K. Hoff, J. Stiglitz) agree with the conclusions of the Peruvian economist. Formation of administrative barriers, insecurity of incomes, adoption of ineffective laws and the failure to enforce effective laws lead to a crisis in the economy.

All of the above concepts complement each other, forming elements of national economic interests that ensure the economic security of the country.

A number of scholars study the concept of «national economic interests» in the Russian science. L. Abalkin perceives national economic interests as providing normal conditions for reproduction and strengthening the economy, where the state acts as the main representative of these interests.

V. Zagashvili refers to national economic interests as the common interest of citizens in preserving the national economy as a whole, as a system with independence in decision-making, i.e., political independence, since economic independence today seems a utopia at best. As a result, it can be concluded that the security of the state's economic system becomes the main national economic interest.

The encyclopedia of market economy defines national economic interests as a set of economic interests that reflect the centripetal backbone ties of the national community. The provision of these interests is possible when creating conditions for the well-being of the population by ensuring the functioning of a market economy, state control, providing the population with a sufficient number of necessary goods and services, as well as the effective functioning of the public sector.

B. Gershkovich defines national economic interests as a system of relations between national, foreign, and international economic entities regarding the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of the country's GDP aimed at the long-term development of the national economy as an integrated and competitive organism in the context of globalization. Yu. Yaremenko defines national economic interests as an expression of the interests of Russian producers that contribute to GDP and the formation and development of the national economy in the context of globalization.

Analyzing the above concepts, it can be stated that national economic interests establish the system of values in the state, ensuring its economic security, and represent a set of systemic relations between the state and companies (both national and foreign) that ensure the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of GDP, which form favorable economic conditions for the development of welfare and secure the competitive advantages of the country, its protection from the economic expansion of other countries on the global stage in the context of the globalization of the multipolar order.

The globalization inherent in the global economy actively influences changes in the country's national economic interests, which are transformed in line with the changing global processes. From the USSR formation to its collapse, the countries existed in the bipolar world paradigm, defining their interests within the interests of the USA or the USSR. The world economic system became unipolar in the beginning of the 90s, and the concepts of national economic interests are now formed as part of the unipolar world. However, the world order has become bipolar since the 2000s, forming various points of attraction other than the USA - for example, China, Russia, and the EU.

3. Methods

The transition from a unipolar world order to a multipolar world order can be traced at the present stage of development of international economic systems, along with an increase in the influence and formation of attraction points other than the USA - such as Europe, China, the Russian Federation, and others.

To confirm the strengthening positions of such countries as the EU member states and China, the data of their export-import operations were analyzed. Methods such as a systematic approach, comparative and statistical research methods were used in the study. The main research methods were search, systematization, evaluation and analysis of the data on export-import operations between the main countries of Europe, China, Russia, and the USA, and subsequent conclusions about the change in national economic interests in the context of the established multipolar world order.

Data on imports of goods to the UK from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA are presented in [Table 1](#) as one of the factors confirming the transition from a unipolar world order to a multipolar world order.

Data on imports of goods to Germany from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA are presented in [Table 2](#).

Data on imports of goods to France from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA are presented in [Table 3](#).

Table 1:
Imports of goods from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA to the UK in 2004-2020, USD bln

Trade partner	China	France	Germany	Italy	Russia	Spain	US
2004	30.097	37.904	68.165	22.826	7.343	16.341	45.42
2005	36.154	38.823	68.953	22.547	9.937	17.426	44.128
2006	41.828	44.721	78.267	24.147	11.494	20.485	53.49
2007	53.228	45.331	90.883	27.223	13.19	21.372	60.646
2008	58.221	45.022	84.616	26.868	14.356	19.332	63.856
2009	52.101	33.935	63.24	20.145	7.547	14.76	52.235
2010	61.734	37.227	76.552	22.186	9.405	15.785	56.612
2011	66.04	39.439	87.752	24.1	12.369	18.889	61.939
2012	56.267	37.746	83.088	22.349	15.072	17.445	61.329
2013	57.588	40.824	88.849	24.719	10.626	19.699	54.494
2014	64.147	43.523	100.31	28.451	10.114	22.037	58.617
2015	62.98	38.704	94.348	25.056	6.702	21.606	58.066
2016	59.576	35.95	88.077	24.155	5.27	21.251	57.103
2017	59.863	36.502	89.695	24.965	7.234	20.198	58.829
2018	63.382	37.848	92.087	26.723	9.438	21.116	63.284
2019	65.53	38.916	85.679	26.245	14.124	21.21	67.079
2020	75.479	30.102	74.403	23.695	24.502	18.567	58.222

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

Table 2:
Imports of goods from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA to Germany in 2004-2020, USD bln

Trade partner	China	France	Italy	Russia	Spain	UK	US
2004	40.442	64.887	43.487	20.241	21.534	42.682	50.013
2005	50.595	66.712	45.183	27.679	22.496	48.503	51.928
2006	62.806	78.033	52.123	37.674	24.903	51.301	61.792
2007	75.048	88.9	60.791	39.577	28.956	59.56	62.436
2008	86.711	98.292	67.808	52.841	31.922	65.135	67.639
2009	77.501	75.882	55.227	34.819	26.787	46.224	55.376
2010	101.38	81.804	57.851	42.1	29.486	51.108	59.594
2011	112.18	92.182	67.054	55.917	31.338	62.37	68.948
2012	102.39	81.827	61.622	54.971	29.824	53.288	67.188
2013	100.31	84.298	62.288	55.103	31.378	52.38	66.557
2014	107.59	88.656	64.47	51.249	32.944	51.159	66.753
2015	103.35	74.158	54.348	33.682	29.045	42.549	68.423
2016	105.29	72.917	57.289	29.453	30.726	39.421	65.816
2017	116.48	73.056	62.372	25.401	35.391	40.957	71.756
2018	126.72	77.322	71.148	30.327	38.364	43.461	78.306
2019	124.35	74.051	63.914	25.357	37.075	42.431	81.475
2020	134.48	64.492	61.687	17.825	35.769	39.212	78.393

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

Table 3:
Imports of goods from the main countries of Europe, Russia, China, and the USA to France in 2004-2020, USD bln

Trade partner	China	Germany	Italy	Russia	Spain	UK	US
2004	20.52	75.412	0	9.127	32.026	0	27.861
2005	25.949	81.704	0	10.068	33.837	0	28.101
2006	30.103	86.144	44.828	12.589	36.359	32.478	31.806
2007	38.728	101.71	52.172	15.135	42.666	33.411	35.572
2008	45.462	113.9	56.494	20.16	45.317	33.671	38.296
2009	41.253	88.207	42.959	12.939	34.255	25.172	34.723
2010	48.873	103.43	44.962	16.136	37.185	25.974	35.235
2011	57.431	121.59	52.32	19.387	42.533	30.649	40.857
2012	53.458	115.58	48.214	15.368	40.06	29.269	42.557
2013	54.222	115.13	48.155	14.051	40.939	27.602	43.526
2014	56.416	112.99	48.083	13.681	39.271	26.021	41.858
2015	51.871	96.15	41.696	7.01	34.961	21.625	38.775
2016	51.033	94.547	42.036	6.119	35.769	21.536	39.679
2017	55.401	97.082	47.045	8.607	39.423	31.123	39.677
2018	59.037	102.25	50.411	11.81	42.9	24.28	41.583
2019	59.564	95.07	48.591	9.747	41.461	24.309	43.772
2020	41.152	101.02	48.601	6.281	45.922	21.942	27.911

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

The trend for subsequent years can be identified using the formula of a linear trend:

$$Y_t = a_0 + a_1 t. \quad (1)$$

Accordingly, the linear trend parameters can be found as follows:

$$a_0 = \bar{y} = \frac{\sum y}{n};$$

$$a_1 = \frac{\sum yt}{\sum t^2}. \quad (2)$$

Based on the above formulas, the linear trend parameters can be found (based on 2012-2020 data) and a trend for 2021-2024 can be built for the main countries of Europe selected as a sample with the dynamics of export-import operations in [Table 4](#).

Analyzing the data from the tables and those obtained during the trend construction, the conclusions can be made about the growing trend of export-import operations, including the supply of goods from Russia, China, and the USA to European countries, such as France, Germany, and the UK, as well as export-import operations between them. Ensuring the national economic interests of their countries, Germany, France, and the UK gradually increase their purchases from European countries and third countries, primarily China, refusing purchases from the former US partners in their favor. However, it should be noted that in 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the decrease in export-import operations. This trend indicates the formation of the multipolar world order and the transformation of national economic interests, where economic security is ensured - in particular, through diversification of the goods supply from various countries.

Table 4:
Trends in the imports of goods to the key EU member states from Russia, China, and the USA for 2021-2024, USD bln

Countries	Total	a_0	a_1	2021	2022	2023	2024	
To France								
1	China	482.154	53.57	-0.41	51.54	51.13	50.72	50.32
2	Russia	92.674	10.30	-0.86	6.01	5.16	4.30	3.44
3	US	359.338	39.93	-0.96	35.14	34.18	33.22	32.26
4	Germany	929.832	103.31	-2.32	91.73	89.42	87.10	84.79
5	UK	227.707	25.30	-0.55	21.43	20.88	20.33	19.77
To Germany								
1	China	1020.97	113.44	4.20	134.43	138.63	142.83	147.02
2	Russia	323.368	35.93	-4.80	11.93	7.14	2.34	-2.46
3	US	644.667	71.63	1.93	81.30	83.23	85.16	87.10
4	France	690.777	76.75	-2.06	66.43	64.37	62.30	60.24
5	UK	404.858	44.98	-1.72	32.95	31.23	29.51	27.79
To the UK								
1	China	564.812	62.76	1.60	70.76	72.36	73.96	75.56
2	Russia	103.082	11.45	0.79	15.40	16.19	16.98	17.77
3	US	537.023	59.67	0.59	62.62	63.21	63.80	64.39
4	France	340.115	37.79	-0.83	33.64	32.81	31.97	31.14
5	Germany	796.533	88.50	-1.09	80.88	79.79	78.70	77.61

Source: Developed by the authors based on the above statistics

4. Results

The export-import operations of the UK, Germany, and France among themselves, as well as with Russia, China, and the USA were analyzed, and their trends were built in the Methods section.

Exports of goods from the UK amounted to USD 399 bln in 2020 (an increase was 14.6% compared to 2019), while imports to the UK amounted to USD 631 bln (an increase was 8.84% compared to 2019). The main partners of the UK in export-import operations are presented in [Table 5](#).

Exports of goods from Germany amounted to USD 1.38 trln in 2020 (an increase was 7.39% compared to 2019), while imports to Germany amounted to USD 1.17 trln (an increase was

5.52% compared to 2019). The main partners of Germany in export-import operations are presented in Table 6.

Exports of goods from France amounted to USD 488 bln in 2020 (an increase was 12.1% compared to 2019), and imports to France amounted to USD 582 bln (an increase was 9.39% compared to 2019). The main partners of Germany in export-import operations are presented in Table 7.

Indicators of export-import operations in the UK, Germany, and France reveal that the USA influence in the world is declining. For example, the indicators of the USA as an importer to Europe are declining, and the European countries secure their national economic interests based on their economic security. For example, the share of imported goods from China is expanding, the share of the EU member states is expanding (Table 1-3), as well as the share of Russia, which lost its positions as an importer after the sanctions in 2014, but is currently increasing it again.

The following trends are revealed at the present stage of the world order development:

- reducing the likelihood of holding major military campaigns between attractor countries;
- modernization by the leading countries of their nuclear capabilities and deployment of a missile defense system;
- destabilization of the strategic situation in the world;
- reducing the level of mutual opposition in strategic offensive weapons;
- reducing the level of centralized arms control by leading countries;
- reducing the mutual coordination between attractor countries, making decisions based on the national economic interests of the leading states;
- declining the role of the USA - in particular, as a «global policeman»;
- increasing the gap between strong and weak states, leading to an increase in the «Weimar syndrome»;
- inability to solve the problems of insolvent countries at the international level;
- emergence of several attractor countries: China, Russia, and the EU member states that secure the implementation of their economic interests and the formation of satellite countries around new points of attraction;

Table 5:
Indicators of the UK export-import operations for 2020

Exports from the UK		Imports to the UK	
US	14.4% (USD 57 bln)	Germany	11.9% (USD 75 bln)
Germany	10.3% (USD 41 bln)	China	11.6% (USD 73 bln)
Netherlands	6.83% (USD 27 bln)	US	9.22% (USD 58 bln)
France	6.2% (USD 24 bln)	Netherlands	7.21% (USD 45 bln)
Ireland	5.88% (USD 23 bln)	France	4.64% (USD 29 bln)
China	4.98% (USD 19.9 bln)	Belgium	4.5% (USD 28 bln)
Switzerland	4.67% (USD 18.6 bln)	Italy	3.87% (USD 24 bln)

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

Table 6:
Indicators of the export-import operations of Germany for 2020

Exports from Germany		Imports to Germany	
US	8.64% (USD 119 bln)	China	11.4% (USD 133 bln)
France	7.97% (USD 110 bln)	Netherlands	7.69% (USD 90 bln)
China	7.5% (USD 103 bln)	US	6.69% (USD 78 bln)
Netherlands	6.44% (USD 89 bln)	France	5.67% (USD 66 bln)
UK	5.51% (USD 76 bln)	Italy	5.51% (USD 64 bln)
Italy	5.33% (USD 73 bln)	Poland	5.24% (USD 61 bln)
Austria	4.99% (USD 69 bln)	Czech Republic	4.57% (USD 53 bln)

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

Table 7:
Indicators of the export-import operations of France for 2020

Exports from France		Imports to France	
Germany	14.3% (USD 69 bln)	Germany	17.3% (USD 101 bln)
US	7.6% (USD 37 bln)	China	9.61% (USD 56 bln)
Spain	7.59% (USD 37 bln)	Italy	8.61% (USD 50 bln)
Italy	7.36% (USD 35 bln)	Belgium	8.33% (USD 48 bln)
Belgium	7.29% (USD 35 bln)	Spain	7.88% (USD 45 bln)
UK	6.34% (USD 30 bln)	US	7.06% (USD 41 bln)
China	4.08% (USD 19.9 bln)	Netherlands	4.78% (USD 27 bln)

Source: TrendEconomy (2021)

- situational associations of strong countries to solve certain problems on the global stage.
- weakening of the role of multilateral institutions and multipateralism, which is increasing under the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic;
- strengthening of the role of the state against the background of the pandemic in solving internal problems, which leads to the risk of undermining the natural dynamics of the market;
- active development of a remote operating principle and digitalization, which can ensure the strengthening of the globalization of the world economy;
- an increase in the risk of deepening socio-economic inequality due to the reduction in employment under the influence of the pandemic around the world;
- intensification of the collapse of the monopolar world, including due to Donald Trump's «America first» policy;
- current lack of a full-fledged opportunity for the PRC to play a leading role in the world, similar to the role of the Soviet Union in its time, but the strengthening of China's role in the world arena with the support of the Russian Federation;
- the continuation of existential difficulties in European countries in connection with the exit from the EU of Great Britain, a change of power in Germany, the possibility of the further existence of the France-Germany tandem, and the closure of borders in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic.

The data on imports of the key EU countries were analyzed in the Methods section, which indicated the development of trade with new points of attraction, including China, and a gradual departure from the influence of the US national interests. Therefore, the EU member states act within their own economic interests, migrating under the influence of the economic interests of strong countries, depending on the situation. Not only satellite countries migrate, but also their points of attraction, which allows to assert the formation of the multipolar world order.

It can be argued that the multipolar world order is currently being formed, which constantly transforms, creating situational unions of the strongest countries to ensure the realization of their national economic interests, as well as the movement of satellite countries from one attraction point to another.

As such, the concept of national economic interests is transformed and now includes the interests of not only the state itself and the attractor state, which are formed in the same direction, but the interests of the state come to the fore and migrate from one attraction point to other, depending on their economic security.

5. Discussion

The origins of the formation of the modern world order began to form after World War I, as a result of which four empires were destroyed: Russian, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and German, leading to the Versailles Treaty, which defined a new world order. The League of Nations was formed a result of the Versailles Treaty to ensure security and peace in Europe. At the same time, a mechanism for the adoption and implementation of decisions made by countries was developed. However, neither the USA nor influential Asian countries (Japan and China) were included there. As a result, the multipolar world order was formed. The Versailles Treaty collapsed in World War II, which culminated in the formation of the Yalta-Potsdam World Order.

The Yalta-Potsdam World Order formed a bipolar world order, where two superpowers - the USSR and the USA - played the leading roles and formed two opposite paths for the development of the world economy: the communist path and the liberal path. Accordingly, this world order represented a confrontation leading to a confrontational interaction, forcing to become an ally of the certain party and fitting the national economic interests into the interests of one of the superpowers, thus limiting its sovereignty. Unlike the League of Nations, the Yalta-Potsdam world order did not have a stable legal base, and its stability was ensured by the «mutual nuclear deterrence.»

The bipolar world order changed in 1991 due to the liquidation of the USSR, and therefore the Yalta-Potsdam World Order ceased to exist. A unipolar world was formed, where the USA possessed full sovereignty. The rest of the countries formed their national economic interests in the same paradigm as the USA, while the latter sought to form its leadership using «soft power». The existing system did not have a common agreement basis; a chain of precedents was formed based on unilateral decisions of the USA, such as the «democracy expansion» doctrine, the concept of NATO expansion, the doctrine of preventive strikes, and the doctrine of democratization of the Greater Middle East.

In fact, the unipolar world order lasted for a decade until 2001 and began to change after the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA. The following two circumstances were identified in connection with the previous terrorist attacks:

- crisis of concepts and mechanisms of international security;
- unpredictability of the system of international relations.

The world began to change in the 2000s under the influence of the multipolar world order. New points of attraction are forming now: China, Russia, and the EU by pursuing a policy of their economic interests to ensure their economic security. As such, countries fighting for their economic sovereignty now appear on the global stage. However, some countries still transfer sovereignty to the USA (such as Poland, the Baltic countries, etc.).

The conflict potential in the modern world order is growing, and mechanisms designed to ensure security, including economic one, can no longer maintain a certain world order. The UN, NATO, and the OSCE fail to ensure the use of adequate countermeasures; thus, control over international crises is reduced.

The COVID-19 pandemic did not cancel the main trends in the development of the world order, but, on the contrary, intensified them, acting as a catalyst for their manifestation. The pandemic has intensified the existing conflicts and contradictions within the framework of the formed economic crisis. The fight against the pandemic has accelerated the redistribution of forces and, as a result, intensified the struggle for world leadership. The US announced the implementation of the «America first» policy, losing its influence in the world amid the intensifying COVID-19 pandemic. China, which quickly coped with the spread of the pandemic and assisted other countries, began to strengthen its position. Thus, the struggle for leadership has intensified, exacerbated by individual socio-economic processes in the EU countries.

The COVID-19 pandemic has strengthened the role of the state, including its separate position on the world stage, which means that the demand for multilateral cooperation to address global threats will increase in the near future. In Europe, Asia, and Africa, the role of both political alliances and regional financial institutions is increasing.

The aggravation of socioeconomic and national problems, as well as the struggle for energy resources and the desire to maintain control over resources all lead to the use of various military and political instruments to solve problems and gain access to certain resources. This situation forces strong countries to determine national economic interests, thus destabilizing the prevailing international relations and forming points of attraction.

6. Conclusion

Despite the multipolarity of the modern world order, Eurasia remains the major region of the world with several points of attraction: China, the EU member states, Russia, and probably India. Therefore, the above countries participate in solving global world problems and support each other's national economic interests depending on the state of international relations.

Nevertheless, the USA continues to strive for world domination, defending its position as a world leader. Russia is not able to act as the sole counterbalance in building a world order system at the moment, due to its economic weakness. As such, it is forced to find common ground with other countries in defending its national economic interests (China, the EU member states, etc.). A similar situation is developing for other attractor countries that cannot single-handedly influence the world order in the modern international relations. Accordingly, the current world order is based on the multivector policy built on the country's tactical and pragmatic considerations and shaping its economic security.

The attractor countries are transforming the world order without changing the position of weak countries. According to the Pareto rule, which is also valid in the world economy, 20% of the population of strong countries consume 80% of all the world resources, while weak countries receive resources in return for obligations to use faulty technology and to store hazardous waste. Thus, weak countries are not able to develop independently and are forced to determine a strong country and build their national economic interests in the latter's paradigm. Moreover, weak countries have limited migration opportunities from one attraction point to another or face a difficult choice.

In the context of globalization, the formation of the multipolar world order must be revised to strengthen the integration of the interests of more countries, which is actively promoted by the annual G20 summit, for example. Promoting such integration, the strongest countries ensure the

development of national economic interests in a single paradigm. The consolidation of interests cannot be achieved in its purest form, but the desire for this influences the strengthening of interdependence, mutual influence, and mutual development of the countries.

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