European sovereign debt crisis: temporary equilibriums modeling in terms of game theory

Economic Annals-XXI: Volume 120, Issue 5-6, Pages: 13-17

Citation information:
Konchyn, V. I., & Maksymenko, M. V. (2012). European sovereign debt crisis: temporary equilibriums modeling in terms of game theory. Economic Annals-XXI, 5-6, 13-17. https://ea21journal.world/index.php/ea-v120-04/

V. I. Konchyn,

M. V. Maksymenko

European sovereign debt crisis: temporary equilibriums modeling in terms of game theory

Abstract. This paper proposes a formalization approach for non-cooperative and cooperative games of entities involved in the decision making process to solve the debt crisis in the Eurozone and EU as a whole. Simulation of various games that cover the diverse strategies of participants in the negotiations and decision-making regarding the situation in Eurozone is attempted. The results from simulated non-cooperative and cooperative games are presented that are expressed in terms of mutual and private losses and gains in the system of finding temporary equilibria vs. their absence.

Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crisis; Pareto Optimum; Maastricht Convergence Criteria; Eurozone; Nash Equilibrium; Cournot-Nash Equilibrium; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games; GIPSI (PIIGS); Games «Merkhollande»; «Sigm’ollande»; «Merkel – Hollande»; «Merkozy»