Entertainment media in the context of hybrid war in the post-Soviet countries: the case of Ukraine

Economic Annals-ХХI: Volume 182, Issue 3-4, Pages: 25-33

Citation information:
Melykh, O., & Korbut, A. (2020). Entertainment media in the context of hybrid war in the post-Soviet countries: the case of Ukraine. Economic Annals-XXI, 182(3-4), 25-33. doi: https://doi.org/10.21003/ea.V182-03


Olga Melykh
PhD (Economics),
Assistant Professor,
Department of International Relations,
Faculty of Social Sciences and Social Technologies,
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
2 Skovoroda Str., Kyiv, 02000, Ukraine
melykhov@ukma.edu.ua
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5603-0917

Anna Korbut
Media Analyst,
Associate Fellow,
Queen II Elizabeth Academy for Leadership in International Affairs,
The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House
10 St James’s Sq., London, SW1Y 4LE, UK
anna.korbut@gmail.com
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/anna-korbut
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2475-7695

Entertainment media in the context of hybrid war in the post-Soviet countries: the case of Ukraine

Abstract. The article provides a complex analysis of how entertainment media can serve to undermine a country’s resilience and security amidst hybrid war using the case of Ukraine as an example.

The paper documents that before the launch of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Russian media products had been heavily present in Ukrainian media space, including the entertainment segment. In 2017, Ukraine restricted access to some Russian media products and social media in its territory in an effort to counter disinformation and the use of user data by Russian security services via their access to the social media based in the Russian jurisdiction. Despite the measures taken by the state to address security challenges, build resilience and fight disinformation in the media, the influence of Russian entertainment media in shaping public opinion remains significant.

In this paper, the authors analyze segments of the media space where Russian entertainment products are present in Ukraine, the tools used by Russia to enforce its narratives through media content, and the ways Ukraine has responded to these. 

This paper aims at demonstrating the role of entertainment mass media in the resilience of countries and how it is used in the context of hybrid war. Also, it looks at the efforts to counter this influence.

The research shows that Russian entertainment media and content act as a soft power or cultural affinity element alongside misinformation or manipulations via news or information content. By using historical references, demonstrating civilizational and moral superiority, showing Slavic brotherhood, Russia and russocentric forces use entertainment media to shape and manipulate public opinion. As content consumption switches from linear media, such as television, to non-linear clusters of conventional and digital outlets, the room for the distribution of manipulative messages and narratives expands. Among other things, this undermines the resilience of countries and endangers their national security, especially in the hybrid war context.

Much is being done to counter this impact. Ukraine’s restrictive measures against some Russian media, social networks and content have been effective in that they have decreased the consumption and the trust for Russian media amongst Ukrainian audiences. Offering alternative content, produced domestically and internationally, has contributed to diversification of the content, moving the audiences from the Russocentric cultural product to a more diverse one.

Keywords: Hybrid War; Television; International Politics; Security; Information War; Resilience; International Relations; Governmental Policy

JEL Сlassification: A13; F52; D8; L82; L88; N4

Acknowledgements and Funding: The authors received no direct funding for this research.

Contribution: The authors contributed equally to this work.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.21003/ea.V182-03

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Received 11.01.2020
Received in revised form 20.01.2020
Accepted 26.01.2020
Available online 15.04.2020
Updated version of the paper as of 23.09.2020